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CHINESE RELIGION, MARKET 
SOCIETY AND THE STATE
Jack Barbalet
Hong Kong Baptist University
Introduction
The familiar discussion of  the nexus between religion and economy has 
emblematic representation in Max Weber’s classic account of  the elective 
affi nity between Calvinism and the spirit of  modern capitalism (Weber, 1991). 
Weber’s demonstration of  the supportive role of  religious belief  for capitalistic 
development is reversed, however, in his treatment of  the history of  China 
in which it is argued that Confucianism and Daoism had a compelling 
restraining impact on economic rationalization (Weber, 1964). This reversal 
has an additional dimension, insofar as an unintended consequence of  
the development of  an expanding market economy and concomitant 
industrialization in China since the Deng Xiaoping reforms in 1978 has been 
to provide a space for religious expression unprecedented since the advent 
of  the communist regime in 1949, and possibly even before this time given 
the predominantly negative policies toward religion by the state during the 
republican period from 1912. Indeed, since the onset of  the reform period 
in the 1980s there has been not only more evidence of  religious commitment 
and activity in both rural and urban areas but also changes in the nature of  
individual religions and in the numbers of  religious adherents.
The most striking religious changes in the People’s Republic of  China 
(PRC) over the last 25 or so years have been twofold. The fi rst consists of  
the reforms in both Buddhism and Daoism, especially in outreach and 
growth in the numbers of  temples, priests and adherents or participants, 
which have largely been state sponsored or supported. The second is that 
the Christian presence in China and its diversity has signifi cantly expanded. 
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However, apart from the permissive and regulatory role of  the state in each 
of  these developments, these trends do not point in the same direction. 
A good deal has been written about the growth of  Christianity in China, but 
it is possibly the least understood of  these changes. Much of  the Christian 
expansion is in the PRC’s rural sector (Huang and Yang, 2005) and while the 
Protestantism that is currently growing in major cities may be seen by some 
of  its adherents as supportive, even expressive of  a free market economy, a 
more comprehensive profi le of  Chinese Christianity suggests a tendency to 
social and economic conservatism. 
It will be shown in the discussion below that a revival of  Buddhism and 
Daoism, which on the surface appears even less remotely connected with the 
promotion of  market economy in the PRC than Christianity, is an important 
mechanism in the provision of  investment required for economic development 
in China. This is because the growth of  Buddhism and Daoism both attract 
and are fueled by overseas Chinese contributors to the mainland economy. 
The capacity of  the overseas Chinese to invest in the PRC derives from their 
success in business, commerce and fi nance in East and Southeast Asia. This 
development raises doubts concerning Weber’s account of  the negative impact 
of  Confucian and Daoist orientations for capitalistic activity. This is because 
the overseas Chinese population that has been economically successful is 
generally endowed with the traditional Confucian and Daoist outlook Weber 
saw as responsible for inhibiting the development of  capitalistic orientations 
and practices. Both of  these aspects of  the relationship between Chinese 
capitalism and Chinese religion shall be discussed in what follows. While these 
issues arise through the historical recentness of  China’s embrace of  a market 
economy, it should not be assumed that its principles are entirely foreign to 
China, a matter raised in the following section.
Laissez-Faire and Daoism: Wu Wei
Joseph Needham, the distinguished author of  the multivolumed Science and 
Civilization in China (1954–2004), famously demonstrated that practically every 
signifi cant invention in human history originated in China: not only gunpowder 
and printing but also alcohol, ball bearings, the magnetic compass, paper, 
toilet paper, the stirrup, the toothbrush and so on. Not only physical but also 
social technologies can be sourced to Chinese origins. While no Needham-
like fi gure has yet written Social Science and Civilization in China, it can be shown 
that the concept of  a laissez-faire instrument of  Chinese political economy, 
for instance, was not only clearly articulated 100 years before Christ but also 
that the Chinese doctrine of  laissez-faire was self-consciously borrowed by 
the eighteenth-century French economist, François Quesnay, in development 
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of  his physiocratic theory (Gerlach, 2005; Hudson, 1961: 322–6; Reichwein, 
1968: 99–110). Anticipating Adam Smith by 1,850 years, the great Han 
Dynasty historian Sima Qian wrote:
There must be farmers to produce food, men to extract the wealth of  
mountains and marshes, artisans to produce these things and merchants 
to circulate them. There is no need to wait for government orders: each 
man will play his part, doing his best to get what he desires… When all 
work willingly at their trades, just as water fl ows ceaselessly downhill day 
and night, things will appear unsought and people will produce them 
without being asked. For clearly this accords with the Way and is in 
keeping with nature. (Chien, 1979: 411)
It is evident within this passage that the conceptual root of  the economic notion 
of  laissez-faire reported here, directed against feudal practices of  interference, 
is Daoist. 
The water metaphor contained in the passage above is characteristic of  the 
principal Daoist texts dating from the third century BC, namely the Daode jing 
(sometimes referred to as the Laozi after its putative author) and the Zhuangzi. 
But more important in demonstrating the Daoist nature of  Sima Qian’s 
discussion is the way in which the passage above expresses the key Daoist 
principle of  wu wei. Wu wei can be translated as “doing less” or “noncoercive 
action.” The passage above from Sima Qian paraphrases sections of  the Daode 
jing in showing that the performance of  trade and the division of  labor occur 
in the absence of  government engagement which itself  indicates that “this 
accords with the Way [or Dao]” and in doing so is consonant with nature: 
It is simply in doing things non-coercively (wuwei) that everything is 
governed properly…do things non-coercively (wuwei) and the common 
people will develop along their own lines. (Ames and Hall, 2003: 
82, 166)
The point of  these passages from the Laozi – and also those from Sima Qian – 
is that a state that practices wu wei does less, yet everything is accomplished in 
accordance with the needs of  the state. 
It is not necessary, of  course, to go back to the Han Dynasty to locate 
evidence of  pre-1978 Chinese inclinations to laissez-faire or market capitalism. 
Well before China embraced a market economy in the 1980s, southern 
Chinese migrants in East and Southeast Asia from the mid-nineteenth century 
and throughout the twentieth century were successfully engaged in capitalist 
activities. It will be shown below that the capitalism of  the overseas Chinese, 
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ironically, has been an instrumental factor in the more recent development of  
a capital market in the PRC, with the help of  the Chinese state. It will also be 
shown that Daoism continues to play a role in Chinese capitalist success, as 
it did in the formulation of  laissez-faire doctrine during the Han Dynasty. It 
might be mentioned parenthetically that in the PRC today, there is continuing 
application of  Daoist principles to analysis of  economic development. Since 
2000 there have appeared in Chinese social science and Party journals a number 
of  articles in which Daoist concepts, especially wu wei and related notions, 
are applied to understanding the development and operation of  China’s 
market economy (see Barbalet, 2011). Given the continuing importance of  
Daoism to Chinese self-understanding of  markets and to an account of  the 
Chinese economy, it is necessary to mention a number of  issues relating to the 
distinctive features of  Chinese religion.
Chinese Religion
It is often noted in indicating the complexity of  Chinese traditions that 
Daoism, for instance, is both a religion and philosophy. We shall return to this 
distinction below. Before doing so, however, it is important to understand 
that the concepts of  both religion and philosophy were until recently unknown 
to Chinese language and culture. The current Chinese term for religion, jiao, is 
an abbreviation of  a word imported at the beginning of  the twentieth century 
from Japanese and sinicized as zong jiao. An earlier Chinese term, san jiao, 
used from the ninth century to refer to Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism 
collectively, means not “three religions” but “three teachings” (Sun, 2005: 
232–3; see also Ashiwa and Wank, 2009: 9). The Chinese term for philosophy, 
zhexue, is also a Japanese invention created at the end of  the nineteenth century 
by combining the Chinese characters for wisdom (zhe) and study (xue). Before 
this innovation there was instead only study of  the canon or great books (jing 
xue) and the traditions of  the masters (zi xue) (Yijie, 2007: 33–4). Daoism, then, 
offers a way of  seeing the world as a means of  being in it – it is one teaching 
(yi jiao) and the texts of  Daoism, for instance the Laozi and Zhuangzi and their 
purported authors, can be objects of  study (jing xue). Daoism as a “religion” 
and “philosophy” in this sense, then, refers only to the fact that it is a pedagogic 
practice and that the practice is associated with books that can be the objects 
of  contemplation, refl ection and commentary. 
At the present time in the PRC, Daoism may increasingly appear to be 
like a religion in the Western sense because it is increasingly transformed 
by regulation, training, professionalization and outreach that derive from 
modern political requirements and cultural transformations (Yang, 2005; 
Dean, 2009). The philological asides of  the previous paragraph help make 
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sense of  the commonplace observation that the notion of  “Chinese religion” 
presents certain problems of  specifi cation and classifi cation because an 
understanding of  religion in the Western sense – of  focus on a deity, a 
sacred-profane dichotomy, transcendence and so on – is not readily located 
in the Chinese cases. The asides also lead us to other aspects of  Chinese 
tradition in addition to the modernizing forces to which Daoism and 
Buddhism are today subjected, which are themselves suggestive of  certain 
limits on how far these “teachings” can go in becoming religions in the 
Western sense. For the sake of  making the argument it is necessary, though, 
in spite of  what has been written above, to refer to Chinese “religion” in 
order to more clearly indicate the nature and context of  these cultural 
practices and patterns of  thought.
In an important sense, Chinese religion and European religion can be 
regarded as practically opposites. Chinese religion has always been polytheistic 
and nonexclusive, whereas European religion is monotheistic and exclusive. 
In China, priests and what would pass in the Western sense as clergy have 
traditionally been small in number and poorly organized (Yang, 1961: 307–27). 
Unlike Western religion, Chinese religion has historically failed to provide social 
services or education (Yang, 1961: 335–9), although this is subject to modest 
change today (Yang and Wei, 2005: 69–70; Lang, Chan and Ragvald, 2005: 
163). Chinese religious nonexclusivity and therefore the absence of  exclusive 
patronage has contributed to the organizational weakness of  Chinese religion, 
whereas Western religious exclusivity has led to a disciplined clergy and well-
organized laity. Marcel Granet summarizes the Chinese case:
The Chinese are not divided up into followers of  one or another of  the 
three faiths; in circumstances fi xed by tradition they appeal at the same 
time to Buddhist or Taoist priests, even to [Confucian] literati or offi cials. 
Not only do they never submit to a dogmatic parti pris, but when they 
have recourse to specialists, they do not show towards them the veneration 
of  the sort due to members of  a clergy. (Granet, 1975: 144)
A fi nal striking difference to be mentioned here between Chinese religion and 
European religion is their relationship with the political state. The Chinese 
state – imperial and republican as well as communist – has always constituted a 
powerful force over and against organized (perhaps it is more accurate to say in 
light of  the above remarks, disorganized) religion, and the Chinese tradition 
is one of  political dominance over and control of  religion (Yang, 1961: 180–217). 
While there have been periods of  state patronage, the typical orientation 
of  the state towards religion since the early Ming Dynasty in the fourteenth 
century has been a mix of  regulation and prohibition (Brook, 2009). The early 
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history of  Christianity, on the other hand, prior to the Reformation, was of  
a continentally organized church empire against small and divided secular 
governments. Against this background, the politically instrumental utility of  
national Protestant churches to European states provided reform churches 
with a power which they may still call upon and exercise in defense of  their 
own independence. 
The image of  the weakness of  Chinese religion created in the preceding 
paragraph relates to its organizational capacities, but a further characteristic 
of  Chinese religion that requires special consideration is its enduring cultural 
presence and force. Before pursuing this theme, however, it is necessary to 
say something about Confucianism, which has so far been ignored. Western 
commentators have frequently regarded Confucianism as a religion even though 
the absence of  religious consciousness with regard to it on the part of  adherents 
suggests that the appellation is misplaced. Indeed, the failed attempt to establish 
a Confucian religion during the republican period for largely political reasons 
(Yang, 1961: 355–8; Sun, 2005: 234–6) suggests the artifi ciality and misleading 
nature of  the idea that Confucianism is a religion in any meaningful sense. 
This is not to say that there are not elements of  Confucianism that arguably 
possess religious qualities, such as self-cultivation productive of  social order or 
harmony expressed in a clear ethical code through a positive orientation to 
ritual practices (see Yang, 1961: 244–77). Perhaps more important than the 
observer ascribed as opposed to adherent experienced religious characteristics 
of  Confucianism is its long-standing and complex relationship, since the ninth 
century, of  opposition and creative engagement with both Buddhism and 
Daoism, that has seen each contest, adapt to and mimic aspects of  the others 
over a long period of  Chinese history.
The last point above can be taken to imply that Confucianism, Buddhism 
and Daoism have changed through their mutual interactions. Of  course, 
such interactions are not the only sources of  change, but they do suggest 
that not one of  these three traditions can be regarded as entirely unitary 
entities when considered over historical time. The point has been made that 
Confucianism, for instance, is “not one philosophy, but many” and that while 
“Neo-Confucianism, a movement dating from the late T’ang…is not only 
signifi cantly different from what went before, (it is) very far from a unifi ed 
philosophy itself ” (Nivison, 1959: 4). Daoism even more than Confucianism 
can be seen as a single label that covers a number of  quite different movements 
and purposes. In a seminal paper that has become the source of  much 
controversy, Herrlee Creel has shown that Daoism is in effect three, not one 
set of  principles and practices (Creel, 1977). 
Creel distinguishes “contemplative” and “purposive” Daoism associated 
respectively with the Zhuangzi and the Daode jing, one cultivating an understanding 
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of  the Dao or Way to achieve inner strength and the other to achieve a means 
of  power and kingly council (Creel, 1977: 4–6). At an historically later period, 
a set of  practices and doctrines were consolidated into a movement that 
went on to manifest variant and divergent forms, but with the continuing 
purpose of  attaining immortality for its practitioners, which amalgamated 
elements of  folk immortality cults, Buddhist organizational forms and the 
Daoist name (Creel, 1977: 7–8). Creel names this third type of  Daoism not 
“religious” Daoism but Hsien Daoism – hsien being an immortal – because 
the “immortality in question was a perpetuation of  the physical body” (Creel, 
1977: 7). The means used to achieve everlasting life or at least extraordinary 
longevity included drugs and alchemic practices, breath control and 
gymnastics, dietary management and macrobiotics, moral (Confucian) 
virtue, sexual techniques, magical rites and charms and talismans – 
all of  which are opposed or ridiculed in the Zhuangzi and the Daode jing 
(Creel, 1977: 8–9). The important point, which it is not Creel’s purpose 
to make, is that irrespective of  their logical and historical relationship the 
anarchistic contemplative Daoism which promotes inner self-cultivation, the 
instrumentally purposive Daoism which navigates social and political power 
and the curative and restorative Hsien Daoism which extends and improves 
life and living have all been contemporaneously available for nearly two 
thousand years within the Chinese cultural framework of  doctrinal and 
practical nonexclusivity.
The characteristic organizational weakness of  Chinese religion, for want 
of  a better term, belies its enduring cultural presence and power. The real 
strength of  Chinese religion arguably derives from what C. K. Yang, following 
Durkheim, calls its “diffused” form (Yang, 1961: 296–300). A religion is 
diffused when its outlook and concepts are insinuated in and dispersed through 
secular social institutions and in that sense are a part of  those institutions. 
Yang reserves this concept for his discussion of  folk religions and especially 
ancestor worship, neither of  which have the benefi t of  organized sanction 
or rationale. But Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism (in each of  its three 
forms) have a continuing diffused, that is noninstitutional representation in 
many aspects of  Chinese life and culture. In the domain of  self-cultivation, 
for instance, Confucian and Daoist concepts are essential for understanding 
Chinese practices; in business, military strategy and environmental policy 
purposive Daoist concepts predominate; in medical and health matters 
and in the rhythm of  mundane life, Hsien Daoist rituals prevail; and so on. 
These and related traditions are diffused through Chinese culture and many 
of  their key concepts are given representation in the Chinese language itself. 
The signifi cance of  the cognitive framework of  Chinese religions will be 
taken up below. 
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State Management of  Religion and the Market Economy 
in China Since 1978
Twenty-fi rst century China can justifi ably be seen as a site of  religious 
effervescence. In addition to the appreciable rise in Christianity there have 
also emerged new religious movements, the best known being Falun Gong 
(Ownby, 2004). Alongside these changes and arguably more important for an 
understanding of  current political and economic developments in the PRC is 
a revival of  Buddhism and Daoism, a signifi cant aspect of  which includes the 
rebuilding of  damaged or destroyed temples. The activity of  temple rebuilding 
is state sponsored, privately funded and quite central to the ongoing expansion 
of  economic development. 
As a large proportion of  temples in China were traditionally communal 
property, it was not unusual even in imperial times for them to be put to 
nonreligious use as the need arose, a process hastened with the formation of  
the republic in 1912 and secular modernization that continued after 1949 
with the establishment of  the PRC (see Yang, 1961: 326, 368). It has been 
estimated that by the end of  the republican period half  of  China’s local 
temples had been destroyed, and that during the period of  the Cultural 
Revolution (1966–76) tens of  thousands of  the remaining Buddhist, Daoist 
and other temples were destroyed as part of  active antireligious campaigns 
(Goossaert, 2003). In contrast to the events of  the 1960s and 1970s in the 
PRC, there has emerged from the early 1980s a new tolerance toward 
religion. The third constitution of  the PRC promulgated in 1978 introduced 
limited guarantees of  religious freedom. Such freedoms have been extended 
in Article 36 of  the subsequent 1982 constitution, which remains current. 
Article 36 indicates a move from state prohibition to state regulation of  
religion; it declares that while religions are not to “engage in activities that 
disrupt public order, impair the health of  citizens or interfere with the 
educational system of  the state” the state shall “protect normal religious 
activities.” What these normal activities might be are not specifi ed except in 
the negative case as indicated. This qualifi ed relaxation of  overall hostility 
towards religion from the late 1970s has accelerated to a positive acceptance 
of  aspects of  religion in particular religions so that by the mid-1990s there 
have been permitted, even encouraged, large-scale and vigorous efforts 
at restoration and refurbishment of  temples and other religious buildings 
destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. By 1996, for instance, 1,722 
Daoist temples had been restored and opened (Dean, 2009: 193). 
The new qualifi ed acceptance of  religion in the PRC is an aspect of  a 
broader liberalization that has accompanied China’s incorporation into the 
international capitalist economy and its entry on to the world political stage. 
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While state suppression of  religious movements such as Falun Gong (Tong, 
2009) and the smaller Dongfang Shandian (Eastern Lightning) continues in the 
PRC (Dunn, 2009), the constitutional guarantees of  freedom of  religious belief  
and practice are given meaningful expression for Buddhist, Daoist, Catholic, 
Protestant and Islamic organizations that are affi liated with the state-controlled 
umbrella bodies (see Yang, 2007: 636–8). A link between China’s religious 
liberalization, especially the rebuilding of  Buddhist and Daoist temples, and 
the development – indeed exuberant blossoming – of  a market economy in 
the PRC is to be found in a further and connected dimension of  government 
reorientation since the mid-1980s, namely a reversal in attitude to the Chinese 
Diaspora. Temple rebuilding attracts overseas Chinese investment. There is a 
new motto for capital acquisition given voice by local government in the PRC: 
“Build the religious stage to sing the economic opera” (Yang, 2006: 109).
The changing offi cial attitude in the PRC to the overseas Chinese is central 
for an understanding of  both the revival of  religion and the development 
of  a capital market. From Liberation (1949) up until the immediate post–
Cultural Revolution period, the Chinese political leadership entertained 
a thorough and intense suspicion of  the overseas Chinese. As the PRC 
has joined the globalized international market, the economic skills of  the 
overseas Chinese and their capacity to provide investment capital that had 
earlier led to their stigmatization as “Capitalist Roaders” have been evaluated 
positively by offi cial forces in the PRC since the 1980s. Those skills and that 
capacity are now seriously sought by the Chinese market economy. Indeed, 
since the 1980s there has been much offi cial encouragement of  overseas 
Chinese to invest in the PRC. One means of  attracting overseas Chinese 
investment has been through the temple door. After opening its borders as 
a consequence of  the Deng Xiaoping reforms, the PRC has facilitated visits 
by signifi cant numbers of  overseas Chinese persons who since liberalization 
have returned to family home sites in the PRC for religious and mortuary 
rituals (Fan, 2003; Lai, 2003). The program of  temple rebuilding mentioned 
above has coincidentally and conjointly been encouraged enormously 
through donations made by overseas Chinese individuals and families (Yang 
and Wei, 2005: 71–2, 86; Lang, Chan and Ragvald, 2005: 157–9). In this 
way, the erstwhile “Capitalist Roaders” are led to occupy an important place 
in the course of  Chinese economic development (Maddison, 2007: 172–3; 
Redding, 1993: 231ff.). Indeed, up to the mid-1990s overseas Chinese 
investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore contributed 75 percent 
of  foreign capital to China, and if  other overseas Chinese are included the 
fi gure goes up to 85 percent, amounting to approximately US$200 billion 
(Hamilton, 2006; Redding, 1995; Sen, 2001: 3).  
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Capitalism, China and Max Weber
It is not simply the magnitude of  growth and strength of  China’s market 
economy that is so impressive, but also that it erupted against all expectations. 
It could be argued, of  course, that in effectively abandoning socialism, 
embracing the market and joining capitalist globalization, China’s economic 
growth was inevitable. The limitations of  this argument can partly be seen in 
India’s failure to enjoy Chinese levels of  economic expansion. It is important 
to notice, as mentioned above, that during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century mercantile and fi nancial dynasties were formed within overseas 
Chinese communities, demonstrating the way in which market opportunities 
could be realized by persons who adhered to Chinese religions. Nevertheless, 
in an argument that continues to hold the attention of  many sociologists, Max 
Weber insisted that traditional Chinese religions and the familial commitments 
associated with them are antithetical to the development of  capitalism (Weber, 
1964). However, in the face of  recent Chinese economic success in both 
overseas Chinese populations and in the post-1978 PRC, the task must be to 
explain afresh how Chinese religion and associated family structure might be 
related to capitalist development. 
Weber’s characterization of  Chinese religion in The Religion of  China is 
to demonstrate the cultural basis of  a failure in Imperial China to develop 
rational or modern industrial capitalism. Weber holds that traditional Chinese 
values in the form of  Confucianism promoted an orientation of  talent to 
state service, to scholarly pursuits that tended to preserve tradition and at the 
same time to dissuade thinkers from innovation. Confucianism, according to 
Weber, generates a rationalism that leads persons to adjust to the world rather 
than encouraging them to change it (Weber, 1964: 248). Daoism, Weber says, 
promotes an orientation to simplicity in life and harmony with nature. Both of  
these philosophies or religions are held to discourage capitalistic accumulation 
and profi t seeking. While this broad characterization of  Chinese traditional 
values is more or less descriptively accurate for the period covered by Weber’s 
study, it is quite a different matter to claim that these values were causally 
implicated in the failure to develop industrial capitalism in Imperial China. 
Indeed, it is likely that the key inhibiting constraints on Chinese economic 
development were not cultural. John Hall, for instance, has shown that 
at crucial times in its long history the imperial Chinese state chose to limit 
capitalism even as it developed for political reasons (Hall, 1986: 33–57). In 
more directly addressing Weber’s concern regarding the absence in China 
of  the development of  industrial capitalism, Mark Elvin (1973: 286–315, 
1983) argues that a failure to continue an historically established pattern 
of  innovation necessary for industrialization, which occurred around 1820 
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through an insuffi ciency of  demand – what he calls a “high-level equilibrium 
trap” – inhibited capitalist industrialization in China.
Evidence of  both political and economic structural limitations challenge the 
adequacy of  Weber’s argument that “rational entrepreneurial capitalism…has 
been handicapped [in China]…by the lack of  a particular mentality” (Weber, 
1964: 104). It is not, however, the purpose here to claim that consideration of  
Confucianism and Daoism is irrelevant to an understanding of  economic 
processes and especially entrepreneurial activity in Chinese cultural areas. But it is 
important to recognize, contrary to Weber’s approach, that the social consequences 
of  culture, and values in particular, are not internal to the culture or values 
themselves but are contextually effective. Therefore, the relationship between any 
given value set and economic outcomes for those holding them may vary with 
changing opportunities and constraints. While Weber attributes Chinese petty 
bourgeois hoarding to Confucian notions of  thrift, for instance, there is no way 
of  knowing whether his theory-laden proposition implies a spurious relationship 
without fi rst paying attention to the constraints on opportunities for consumption 
or investment, which Weber fails to do (Weber, 1964: 245). 
Weber’s inclination to treat institutions in terms of  what he sees as the values 
inherent in them has led to serious misunderstanding concerning the function 
of  key institutions, including the family. In the Protestant Ethic, for instance, 
Weber writes that Protestant vocation or calling generates emotional detachment 
and depersonalizes family relations, thus early modern European entrepreneurs 
are presented as individuals free of  family ties and traditional obligations. This 
perspective on the family is more forcefully stated in his later studies, especially 
in The Religion of  China (Weber, 1964: 237, 240–1, 244), where it is argued that 
family and community are sources of  traditional constraint that inhibit the 
capitalist ethos of  profi t making for its own sake as a result of  religious values. 
This argument is seriously mistaken, however, both for Western capitalism and 
Chinese capitalism. Before considering Chinese religion and capitalism, it is 
necessary to say something about the family in capitalist development. This is 
because the motor of  economic growth is familial capitalism rather than socially 
isolated individuals imbued with self-possessed acquisitiveness in both Europe 
and in the Chinese diaspora from the nineteenth century.
Family as a Resource for Capitalist Development
The unit of  enterprise and the major proximate sources of  commercial and 
business attainment in early modern Europe was not the individual entrepreneur 
free of  family responsibility and commitment, but rather individuals who were 
economically enriched by kinship networks and marital alliances who thereby 
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had immediate access to reputation, credit and uniquely reliable associates 
(Grassby, 2000). The pattern of  European familial capitalism persisted into 
the nineteenth century (Farrell, 1993; Scranton, 1983) and continued even to 
the twentieth century, even though by this time national markets for long-term 
investment were functioning (Postan, 1935: 5–6) thus rendering family credit 
less important. Writing in the early 1970s, Maurice Zeitlin indicated that in 
spite of  the widespread belief  concerning managerial control, the majority of  
fi rms in the United States, for instance, continued at that time to be subject 
to family control and that a large number of  the fi nancial institutions that 
controlled fi rms which were not directly owned by families were themselves 
family owned and controlled (Zeitlin, 1974). A more recent study suggests 
that the incidence of  family ownership in the United States may be as high as 
80 percent and possibly rising (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1999; 
see also Church, 1993). 
This brief  excursion into Western familial capitalism has the purpose of  
suggesting that examination of  the role of  the Chinese family in capitalist 
enterprise, which a number of  studies of  both overseas and mainland Chinese 
business have focused upon (Redding, 1993; Whyte, 1996), is not to highlight 
an exceptional Chinese contribution to a course of  capitalist development but 
to indicate a neglected but signifi cant aspect of  the sociology of  capitalism 
in general. The resources appropriate to capitalistic market production 
and exchange include fi nancial credit, business information and know-how, 
reputation for reliability, able associates, trustworthy and low-cost workers 
and translocal networks. Strong kinship and marital alliances supply these 
resources in abundance. 
Indeed, the signifi cance of  the family for economic activity is demonstrated 
in consideration of  employment costs. Economic theories understand labor 
costs in terms of  supply and demand for skills and effort capacities. Quality 
labor, though, is not simply at the top end of  these latter factors but imbued 
with what John Stuart Mill calls “moral qualities” (Mill, 1940: 110–11). Quality 
labor, then, can be trusted to work at a high level of  effi ciency with relatively 
little supervision whatever its skill or effort capacity. The preparedness of  
employers to pay above the market rate for workers with these moral qualities 
is addressed by effi ciency wage theory. Family labor, though, simply reverses 
effi ciency wage theory because quality labor is not only effi ciently selected 
through family relations but in family enterprises is frequently paid well below 
market rates without risking labor turnover, sabotage or shirking. The role of  
wives working for low or no wages in family fi rms as business managers or 
accountants is well known in the West and has recently been demonstrated 
for family enterprises in the PRC’s private sector (Goodman, 2004, 2007; 
Tsai, 2007: 112–14). This is not to say that ineffi ciency and nepotism cannot 
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occur in family fi rms (see Redding, 1993: 133–4), but that familial capitalism 
is not necessarily nonrational, as Weber maintains. Indeed, the application of  
transaction cost analysis and agency contract theory to family enterprises 
identifi es the aspects of  and conditions under which familial capitalism may 
operate at high levels of  market rationality (Pollak, 1985; Steier, 2003).
Chinese families, because they are constituted by transgenerational and 
lateral networks, are particularly adept at providing the resources for or means 
of  capitalistic agency (Goody, 1996: 151–61; Whyte, 1996: 9–13). Differences 
between Chinese and Western families in business derive from cultural 
differences – much is made, for instance, of  the Confucian basis of  Chinese 
family structure and practices – but there are also highly salient contingent 
differences. Gordon Redding, for instance, notes:
The environments in which [overseas Chinese business families] are 
accustomed to operate have not been notable for their hospitality to 
business enterprises or to Chinese entrepreneurs. Such entrepreneurs 
have developed a well-justifi ed wariness in the face of  offi cialdom and 
a well-honed set of  defensive weapons to ensure their survival in an 
uncertain world. (Redding, 1993: 4) 
These learned characteristics are particularly useful when operating within the 
orbit of  the capricious administration of  the PRC. While familial capitalism 
is not necessarily the only factor in the development of  post-1978 Chinese 
market capitalism, it is an important one (Whyte, 1996: 9).
Action: Opportunity Structures and Resources
As indicated above, Chinese families are an effi cient basis of  the provision 
of  means for engaging in capitalist activity by reducing the transaction costs 
of  credit and fi nance and by lowering the agency costs of  management, 
administration and labor. It will be shown here that Chinese religion is 
particularly important in effectively increasing the opportunities for applying 
those means in money making. But this requires a very different approach 
than Weber’s to both religion and action. 
The close fi t between Weber’s sociology of  religion and his theory of  action 
is readily located in The Protestant Ethic, for instance: Weber approaches religion 
by identifying the values implicit in religious doctrine as a primary source 
in the social actor’s construction of  meaning which in turn is generative of  
individual motivation or the orientation of  action. But the understanding of  
action in terms of  values as the basis of  motive raises a number of  problems, 
not the least of  which are that effective values are more likely to be the 
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outcomes of  actions rather than their antecedents and motives are largely 
inaccessible and frequently innumerable for any given action (Barbalet, 2009). 
Much more important for understanding action are two factors which Weber 
tends to neglect. While he notes in the General Economic History that “rational 
capitalism…is organized with a view to market opportunities” (Weber, 1981: 
334), Weber tends to have very little to say about structures of  opportunities 
for action (Barbalet, 2008: 218–19, 221) and he also tends to ignore the means 
required for the achievement of  opportunities (Barbalet, 2008: 123–5). If  
we think of  capitalism in terms of  opportunities for money making through 
market exchanges and the particular resources required to take advantage 
of  or to mobilize for those opportunities, then a general form of  motivation 
can be simply assumed and individual motives cease to be of  theoretical 
interest in understanding economic action. If  we think of  action in terms of  
opportunities and resources or means then the family, for instance, can be seen 
as one source of  the means required for market exchanges as indicated above 
and perception of  opportunities can be treated as part of  a cultural-cognitive 
apparatus within which religion may play a role. 
The apprehension of  novel opportunities for profi t making – through the 
discovery of  a market niche, for instance, or a new way of  deploying existing 
resources – is widely recognized as fundamental for market success under 
capitalist conditions. The concept of  opportunity structure therefore addresses 
the question of  the potential for new profi t generation and the expansion of  
the market and economic activity. The signifi cance of  opportunity structures 
is understood in practice by all economic actors. However, theoretical 
discussion of  opportunity has been marred by naturalistic and individualistic 
assumptions. For instance, in his important statement of  the theory of  the 
entrepreneur, Joseph Schumpeter regards opportunities or what he calls 
“possibilities” as something that are “offered by the surrounding world” 
and are simply “always present” (Schumpeter, 2008: 79, 88). Schumpeter’s 
supposition that there is no need for a mechanism to generate or realize manifest 
opportunities from latent “possibilities” is a refl ection of  his conceptualization 
of  entrepreneurship in terms of  individual will and motivation (Schumpeter, 
2008: 93–4). While more recent studies have focused on the entrepreneur’s 
characteristically astute grasp of  opportunities, their theoretical framework 
continues to assume that individual mental processes of  cognition are suffi cient 
bases of  explanation (Mitchell et al., 2002; Shane, 2004). The approach 
proposed here, on the other hand, places the perception of  opportunities not 
in individual cognitive psychological processes but in cultural apparatuses, 
including religious frameworks. 
While opportunities may be latent in existing arrangements, as Schumpeter 
holds, opportunities are necessarily prospective – not material – realities and 
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become manifest only when they are taken. Opportunity structures therefore 
only exist as hypotheses or as constructed or discovered possibilities dependent 
on a particular conjectural perception. Like all perception, the involvement 
of  anticipation and therefore emotion and imagination are central to the 
formation of  opportunity structures, including those for profi t making. 
Religion may play a role here if  religion is part of  a cultural apparatus that 
contributes to the notional location or formation of  opportunities for profi t 
making. Whether Protestantism, for instance, can be part of  such a cultural 
apparatus must be a matter for empirical investigation. Because religious 
dissenters, as critics of  an established order, may possess novel cognitive 
orientations or capacities, it is possible that if  they are business orientated 
they could perceive opportunities for profi t making that may not otherwise 
be visible. The difference between this argument and Weber’s is large. It is 
not that Protestantism leads to a capitalistic ethic but that should Protestants 
be capitalistically involved, then their religion, not as a set of  values but as 
a culturally provided cognitive framework, may generate a perception of  
opportunity for profi t through affective and imaginative appraisal of  future 
prospects irrespective of  whatever motive may direct them to profi t making.
Weber implicitly and unintentionally raises the question of  opportunity in 
a way compatible with the manner it is set out here. Toward the end of  The 
Religion of  China he says enigmatically in the context of  his preceding remarks 
that “The Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, probably more 
capable than the Japanese, of  assimilating capitalism which has technically 
and economically been fully developed in the modern cultural area” (Weber, 
1964: 248). How they might achieve this Weber does not say, apart from a 
suggestion that cultural osmosis may be the mechanism – he refers to Canton 
(now Guangzhou) as one place it has happened because of  the large numbers 
of  foreigners there (Weber, 1964: 242). It must be noted, though, that in a 
slightly later work Weber claims that the Japanese are more likely than the 
Chinese to “take over capitalism as an artefact from the outside” (Weber, 
1960: 275). Given Weber’s insistence on the incongruity of  the values of  
Chinese religion and capitalism – in which the motive for profi t making as 
an end in itself  in market exchanges cannot be deduced from the values of  
Chinese religious ethics – it is ironic that the cognitive structure of  Chinese 
religions can function as instruments in expanding the horizon of  capitalistic 
opportunities, as indicated below.
Chinese Religion and Expanding Opportunity Structures
It was mentioned above that Chinese religions cohabit within a polytheistic 
culture of  nonexclusivity. It is feasible to suppose that this nonexclusivity has 
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played a role in the advancement of  China’s post-1978 market economy 
insofar as the mindset of  religious nonexclusivity is part of  a cultural 
apparatus which, in the context of  market exchanges, encourages the 
perception and apprehension of  opportunities which may otherwise not be 
apparent. Because of  the lateral elective cognitive mobility available within 
the Chinese religious universe, which is an aspect of  religious nonexclusivity, 
there is an increased likelihood of  a sharpened awareness of  an expanding 
range of  possible opportunities in any given situation. But within the 
lattice of  Chinese religious nonexclusivity, the different religions do not 
equally play a role in encouraging an expanding appreciation of  market 
opportunities. Therefore, it is necessary to give consideration to the different 
capacities of  Buddhism, Confucianism and Daoism to contribute to the 
likely apprehension of  market opportunities.
Chinese Buddhism comprises a number of  different “schools” but is unifi ed 
in being “this worldly” (Mahayana) rather than “other-worldly” (Theravada) in 
its concerns (Liu, 2008: 218–9). Chinese Buddhist acceptance of  performance 
of  mundane activities in achieving nonattachment or nonselfhood (the 
absence of  enduring identity) in renunciation of  the world and profi t seeking 
within it contributes to a cognitive apparatus that limits rather than expands 
the optional set within an opportunity structure. The general and therefore 
potentially transferable ethical prescriptions of  Buddhism similarly offer no 
encouragement that it might cognitively support an expansive opportunity 
structure. Buddhist ethics assume the impossibility through moral regulation 
of  improvement of  a social order comprising persons with human desires 
and interests. The affective or emotional direction of  Buddhism, therefore, is 
disengagement from and aversion to this-worldly economic action.
Confucianism, in emphasizing a “middle way” (zhong yong) approach 
to life and conduct, encourages neutrality, stability and avoiding extreme 
positions. This has the effect of  confi ning the appreciation of  opportunities to 
a limited range of  prospects and stabilizing rather than radically expanding 
the optional set within an opportunity structure. Because Confucianism 
is restricted to precedent and has a this-worldly orientation – it both faces 
the past and is realist – it tends to be restrictive of  imagination. At the same 
time, however, the Confucian understanding of  fate does include a signifi cant 
agentic element: persons establish their own fate by planning ahead, applying 
their best abilities and taking responsibility for their own actions. According 
to Confucian teaching, the controlling capacity of  fate is not at the level of  
the selection and execution of  a course of  action but in whether such actions 
might succeed or fail (Yang, 1961: 229, 272–3). Thus fate, rather than another 
human agent, is responsible for the success or failure of  a given person’s 
action. On balance, then, and especially relative to Buddhism, Confucianism 
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tends to cognitively expand rather than contract the optional set of  any given 
opportunity structure.
The presentation of  Daoism in Weber’s Religion of  China emphasizes 
what he sees as three essential qualities: its mysticism (Weber, 1964: 180–8), 
its focus on macrobiotics and immortality (Weber, 1964: 191, 204) and 
its traditionalism – “more traditionalist than orthodox Confucianism” – 
predicated on the use of  magical techniques (Weber, 1964: 205). In his account, 
Weber confuses and confl ates what were earlier in this chapter distinguished 
as contemplative, purposive and Hsien Daoisms, rendering his globalizing 
assessment unsustainable. Weber’s claim that the Laozi or Daode jing contains 
an exposition of  “contemplative mysticism” (Weber, 1964: 186) refl ects what 
has been described as an antagonistic Confucian interpretation (Hansen, 
1992: 7) widely accepted by the Christian missionaries who wrote many of  
the sources Weber drew upon. Indeed, one scholarly assessment is that the 
leading Daoist ideas are “more intellectual than mystical” (Granet, quoted in 
Creel, 1970: 15), although there is no consensus about this in the literature. 
While some scholars insist on the mystical nature of  Daode jing (Schwartz, 
1985) others see it as an antimystical and naturalistic or protoscientifi c work 
(Needham, 1956; Moeller, 2006; see also Lau, 1963: xxxviii–xli). The principle 
text of  Daoism, Daode jing, while appearing to some as a set of  mystical poems 
is at the same time readily seen as a handbook of  statecraft, with a purpose 
of  political counsel and kingly advice anticipating Machiavelli’s The Prince. 
Indeed, the politically instrumental orientation of  the text is demonstrated 
throughout a third-century commentary by Wang Bi (1999), a work which 
continues to inform the Chinese understanding of  the Daode jing. Neither 
is it possible to show that Daode jing or Zhuangzi advocate magical means 
or are necessarily traditionalist. Traditional thought and practice, rather, 
are vulnerable to a key deconstructive tendency within purposive Daoism 
(Needham, 1956: 33–164). These are the inherent attributes of  Daoism that 
positively encourage nonexclusivity and an experimental expansion of  the 
optional set within any given opportunity structure. These latter are achieved 
through development and promotion of  the concept and practice of  what 
might be described as “paradoxical integration.” 
Paradoxical integration entails that opposite elements of  a thing are 
interdependent and mutually supportive, best represented in the relationship 
between yin and yang. The opposition between elements of  a paradoxical 
integration is not contradictory in the Western sense that one element eliminates 
the other, but rather is held to give rise to generative relationships of  a number 
of  types between opposites. Daode jing is a veritable handbook of  paradoxical 
integration, with more than forty percent of  the text occupied with examples 
and expositions of  paradoxical integration. Thus, according to the Daode jing, 
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opposites are held to be mutually productive of  each other, for instance, that in 
order to achieve a purpose its opposite must be attempted, that a thing seems 
to be quite other than it is, and so on (Ames and Hall, 2003: 80, 133, 140–41). 
The Daoist notions of  strength in weakness and advantage in threat or danger 
generate perceptions of  opportunities in market engagements which might 
otherwise not materialize. 
Daoism has been relatively neglected in considerations of  Chinese religion, 
probably because it is institutionally weaker than Buddhism. The diffuse nature 
of  Chinese religion, however, means that its importance and infl uence cannot 
be measured by the number of  its supporters but by the pervasiveness of  its 
concepts. The conventional approach of  associating overseas Chinese business 
success with Confucian principles, for example, is based on the assumption that 
Chinese family dynamics are Confucian (Haley, Haley and Tan, 2004; Haley, 
Tan and Haley, 1998; Redding, 1993; Whyte, 1996). There is more than an 
element of  truth in this supposition, even though it neglects the importance of  
Daoist ideas concerning family and marital relations. These ideas round out 
and strengthen Confucian precepts associated with the durability of  Chinese 
families, especially in terms of  Daoist encouragement of  discovering “the 
natural” course in relationships and in emphasizing the importance of  the 
feminine and therefore encouraging a certain type of  regard for women.
Conclusion
Chinese religion and China’s market economy can be seen as mutually 
supportive in a number of  ways. First, the revival of  Buddhism and Daoism in 
post-1978 China has been a conduit for investment in the market economy of  
the PRC from the Chinese diaspora. Second, the success of  overseas Chinese 
since the nineteenth century in capitalist ventures in East and Southeast Asia 
suggests a positive relationship between market rationality on the one hand 
and Chinese religion and family on the other that raises questions concerning 
the received Weberian perspective. Third, an approach to religion as part of  a 
cultural apparatus instrumental in the apprehension of  opportunity structures 
for capitalistic activity is outlined in the chapter, which indicates the signifi cance 
of  Chinese religious nonexclusivity in general and Daoism in particular for 
successful market engagements through opportunity perceptiveness.
Throughout the chapter, the signifi cance of  the relationship between the 
political state and religion has been indicated. The long historical relationship 
in China between the state and religion has been characterized as one of  
state regulation of  religion moderated by brief  interspersed episodes of  
patronage or prohibition. Regulatory relations have frequently included 
co-option of  religious forces for state purposes. This is demonstrated in 
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the present post-1978 period by the state sponsored but privately funded 
program of  temple restoration that is a conduit for capital investment in the 
PRC by overseas Chinese. 
In contrasting Chinese and Western religion it was shown above that a 
Chinese term for religion, zong jiao, was invented in the nineteenth century 
because none had previously existed. Religion in the modern Western sense of  
a belief  system supported by doctrine, organization and leadership has simply 
been absent in Chinese society. Chinese traditions of  temples, ritual practices 
and ceremonial practitioners relate to local communities and the rhythms of  
their needs in multifunctional spaces in which liturgy has little salience and 
performative elements prevail. In this context the introduction of  a concept 
of  “religion” as a system of  belief  carried by a congregation organized by 
a professional clergy challenges traditional community rituals and practices 
by separating out “superstition” and also “culture” from “religion” to the 
detriment of  the traditional forms (Ashiwa and Wank, 2009: 9–12; Dean, 2009: 
188–91). Thus, the nineteenth-century invention of  Chinese religion, which 
Weber draw upon and contributed to, in this sense was a further instrument 
of  state regulation in the service of  modernization.  
An aspect of  Chinese religion, to use the term on notice, which has remained 
more or less outside the reach of  state regulation and control, is referred to 
above as its “diffused” aspects. This includes the conceptual and dispositional 
elements of  a cultural legacy that exist in language and idiom. This aspect 
of  Chinese religion is signal in the acumen of  Chinese business in generating 
an expansive opportunity structure necessary for market engagement, as 
indicated in discussion above.
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